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Introduction 
 
In the late 1990s, ‘East Asian regionalism’ became a realistic term to describe several 
emerging relational frameworks in East Asia. The ASEAN+3 framework, which is often 
called ‘APT’ (ASEAN Plus Three), is one of the most important frameworks that 
advocates East Asian regionalism. This framework is a cooperative among members of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the countries of Japan, China 
and Korea. It functions at the senior official, ministerial and summit levels. It was 
founded in 1997 when the first summit was held among leaders of ASEAN+3 member 
states. The third ASEAN+3 summit in 1999 produced the first joint statement. This 
statement included the need for cooperation in economic, social, political, and security 
fields. Since then, ASEAN+3 has emerged as a comprehensive framework with a wide 
range of agendas, and ASEAN+3 members regularly conduct not only a summit but also 
various ministerial meetings.  
  This article concerns how institutions in ASEAN+3 affect development of the 
direction and nature of the ASEAN+3 framework. Institutions are defined in various 
ways, but this article adopts two definitions based on the following: (1) Young (1989: 
32) focuses on social meanings of institutions indicating that they are ‘social practices 
consisting of easily recognized roles coupled with clusters of rules or conventions 
governing relations among the occupants of these roles.’ (2) North (1990: 4) wrote that 
‘institutions include any form of constraints that human beings devise to shape human 
interactions. Are institutions formal or informal? They can be either.’ Using these two 
definitions, it can be seen that regularized ASEAN+3 meetings are institutions that 
promote cooperation and communication among member states. ASEAN+3, as its name 
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indicates, is an ASEAN framework that concerns external relations, and it was 
developed through exiting ASEAN institutions (Oba 2003; Oba 2004). In 2000, 
ASEAN+3 finance ministers launched the Chiang Mai Initiative that involves a network 
of bilateral swap and repurchase agreement facilities among ASEAN+3 members. This 
agreement is one of the rules that member states are required to follow. Institutions, 
whatever form they take, are important analytical concepts necessary to understand 
characteristics of cooperation in the ASEAN+3 framework.  
  It is necessary to understand the basic institutional setting of the ASEAN+3 
framework in order to determine what kinds of institutions affect development of 
characteristics of the ASEAN+3 framework. Multilateral frameworks range from 
international organizations to loose diplomatic associations. International organizations, 
on one hand, are mainly built on international treaties or legal agreements. Examples 
include the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN). On the other hand, 
loose frameworks are generally based on conference diplomacy. ASEAN, G8 summit 
and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) are examples. Such loose 
frameworks are based not on legal agreements and supranational organizations but 
rather on holding meetings at regular intervals. Given that holding meetings is the main 
activity of the ASEAN+3 framework, this article introduces ‘Chairmanship’ as an 
analytical concept that will aid in understanding how institutions affect development of 
the ASEAN+3 framework. ‘Chairmanship’ is an institution in which the chair or 
chairing member plays an important role in preparing ASEAN+3 meetings. 
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Is ASEAN+3 institutionalized but less organized? 
 
Most approaches to understanding the ASEAN+3 framework conclude that it has two 
institutions: (1) regularized meetings and (2) rules for cooperation written in joint 
documents after these meetings (Tanaka 2003; Kikuchi 2001; Nabers 2003). Based on 
this conclusion, two institutional approaches may be used to analyze characteristics of 
the ASEAN+3 framework.  
  The first approach focuses on regularized meetings in ASEAN+3 and argues that any 
cooperation in the ASEAN+3 framework begins with regularizing meetings among 
ASEAN members and Japan, China and Korea. This argument is based on the 
assumption that the ASEAN+3 framework does not have organizational capacities. 
Archer (2001: 33) defines international organizations as ‘a formal, continuous structure 
established by agreement between members (governmental and/or non-governmental) 
from two or three sovereign states with the aim of pursuing the common interest of the 
membership.’ He adds that ‘the nature of the formal structure should be separate from 
the continued control of one member. It is this autonomous structure that differentiates a 
number of international organizations from a series of conferences or congresses’ 
(Archer 2001: 33). From this perspective, ASEAN+3 would seem to be less organized 
because it is not based on founding treaties, it has little legal character, and it has no 
internal organ. Hund (2003: 410) argues that ‘the APT process has developed only very 
few institutions, although the process itself can be said to be firmly established through 
regular summit and ministerial meetings.’ Webber (2001: 340) stated that ‘[a]lthough 
the APT, like APEC, is not based on any treaty or formal binding agreement between 
the participating states, and although it has no central secretariat, the web of relations 
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between the members has grown quickly since the first meeting of the heads of 
government in 1997.’ By 2004, ASEAN+3 has had no organizational capacity but 
Stubbs (2002: 450) foresees the possible direction of the ASEAN+3 framework as 
moving towards the formation of an organization, arguing ‘[c]ertainly, both APEC and 
ASEAN have more organizational depth than the APT, but overall the APT has quickly 
embarked on some important, practical projects that will help to move the region 
forward in its quest for economic cooperation. The APT’s potential as East Asia’s main 
regional economic organization should not, therefore, be underestimated.’ Regularized 
meetings are important institutional settings to promote cooperation and explain one 
characteristic of the ASEAN+3 framework. However, it is not clear in this approach 
whether or not regularization of the meetings can explain the development of the 
direction and nature of ASEAN+3. 
  The second approach argues that rules for substantial cooperation in the ASEAN+3 
framework are written in official documents or statements that are taken as agreements 
among its member states. International Regimes Theory may shed light on this 
argument, focusing on formal and informal ‘institutions’ to explain cooperation (Young 
1989; Hasencleaver and Rittberger 1997; Krasner 1983; Haggard and Simmons 1987). 
‘Formal institutions’ refer to written or legalized codes and organizations whereas 
‘informal institutions’ refer to unwritten rules or codes of conduct and shared patterns of 
behaviors among relevant members. Analysis using the concept of ‘informal 
institutions’ is familiar in institutional theories (Hall and Taylor 1996). However, this 
work does not use ‘informal institutions’ as the central analytical concept, but rather as 
an aid in understanding the importance of ‘formal institutions’ (Keohane 1989:162-66). 
In this respect, an international regime is a difficult concept to distinguish from 
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international law.1 Webber (2001: 341) mentions that ‘the first significant concrete 
“product” of APT is an agreement, reached at Chiang Mai in Thailand in May 2000, to 
establish a regional currency-swap facility to enable the states to protect themselves 
better against any future crises of the kind that swept through much of the region, with 
such devastating economic and social consequences, in 1997-98.’ The 1997 Asian crisis 
escalated regional awareness of the need to build financial architecture in East Asia. 
This characterized the ASEAN+3 as a framework for dealing with financial and 
monetary cooperation. In particular, resentment against the US on dealing with the crisis 
promoted monetary cooperation among ASEAN+3 members (Webber 2001: 358-9; 
Higgott 1998; Bergsten 2000). Dieter and Higgott (2002: 2) argue that ‘ “[t]he East 
Asian” region will become an increasingly important domain within which to explore 
protection against financial crises and what we might call “monetary regionalism” is 
now firmly on the regional agenda.’ The 2000 Chiang Mai Initiative is a concrete 
agreement and an important ‘institution’ for describing ASEAN+3 as a framework for 
promoting financial and monetary cooperation. However, this ‘institution’ reflects the 
direction and nature of the ASEAN+3 framework as being a result of consultation and 
negotiation among members who faced external events such as the Asian crisis. 
‘Institutions’ that are the focus of this approach, do not explain development of the 
characteristics of ASEAN+3. 
  These two approaches describe basic institutional aspects of the ASEAN+3 
framework but do not explain how institutions affect development of the direction and 
nature of the ASEAN+3 framework. Rather, they imply that non-institutional factors 
affect development of characteristics of ASEAN+3. Terada (2004: 271-72) and Webber 
(2001; 361-4) argue that Japan and China could exercise joint leadership to affect the 
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direction and nature of the ASEAN+3. However, this article proposes that institutions 
are still important as factors that affect the development of characteristics in the 
ASEAN+3 framework. The ASEAN+3 framework lacks organizational settings. 
Therefore, most approaches do not go beyond the conclusion that ASEAN+3 has no 
organizational settings. Internal organs in international organizations function to 
manage and organize meetings among the members. As long as there are meetings 
regularized in the ASEAN+3 framework, it is possible to find institutions with an 
organizational element to manage and organize these meetings. The concept of 
‘Chairmanship’, introduced in this article, contains an organizational element that is an 
alternative to internal organs or other functional institutional settings. This analytical 
concept also has a meaningful implication for arguments regarding leadership described 
above in that the chair plays the role of ‘institutionalized leadership.’ 
 
 
Chairmanship as an analytical concept 
 
This article introduces the ‘Chairmanship’ as an analytical tool for determining how 
institutions affect the direction and nature of multilateral frameworks. ‘Chairmanship’ is 
defined as an institution in which the chair plays an important role in organizing 
multilateral frameworks through preparation of meetings. The chair is not assumed by a 
specific person but by one of the member states of the multilateral framework.  
  ‘Chairmanship’ has three characteristics in affecting the direction and nature of 
multilateral frameworks. First, the role of the chair primarily consists of inviting new 
members, setting agendas, building consensus, and drafting joint statements. Second, 
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since the chair is assumed by one of the framework members, it is likely that the 
country holding the chair will attempt to promote its own national interests by taking 
advantage of the position. The chairing member state is also strongly affected by its 
own domestic institutions and divergent interests as well as relations with other 
members.  
  Third, the ‘Chairmanship’ is an informal institution developed with the mutual 
understanding of the members of the multilateral framework. The chair is usually a host 
country that provides the place for a meeting. The chair to follow will often be 
mentioned as the next host country in official documents such as joint statements 
released after meetings. These documents usually state the date, the place, and the name 
of the member state chairing the next meeting. However, official documents do not give 
specific details regarding what roles or functions the chair is expected to play in 
preparing for meetings. It is assumed in this article that the role of the chair has 
gradually been identified as the member state that takes charge of the chair by turn. The 
rotating chair thus attempts to invite new members, set agendas, and build consensus 
through the trial and error process of preparing meetings. These repeated behaviors 
construct roles of the chair as rules shared among members. 
  This analytical framework is supported by studies on the roles of chairs in several 
multilateral frameworks. As examples of regional multilateral frameworks, the 
European Community (now the EU) has an institution called the ‘Presidency’, and this 
role rotates among members every six months (Kichner 1992; O’Nuallain and Hoscheit 
1985). The EU Presidency is mentioned in EU treaties. However, it is only stated that 
‘the office of the presidency shall be held in turn by members and it shall convene 
“meetings”’ (Schout 1998: 3). Although the General Secretariat of the Council in EU 
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has released a Presidency Handbook (Council Secretariat 2001), it only explains the role 
of Presidency in broad terms and leaves different interpretations the role of this position. 
Tallberg (2003) introduced the idea of agenda-shaping powers of the EU Council 
presidency, arguing that agenda-shaping has three forms: agenda-setting, 
agenda-structuring and agenda exclusion. Elgström (ed. 2003: 1-2) correctly recognizes 
that having the EU presidency is seen as the opportunity to advance particular national 
interests, so the ways in which member states approach their presidency periods are 
diverse. The chair in APEC rotates each year, and the order of this rotation has not been 
fixed. The Seoul Declaration stated that ‘[p]articipants who wish to host ministerial 
meetings will have the opportunity to do so, with the host in each case providing the 
chairman of the meeting and [t]he senior officials’ meeting will be chaired by a 
representative of the host of the subsequent annual ministerial meeting, and will make 
necessary preparations for that meeting’ (APEC 1991). By 1998, ASEAN and 
non-ASEAN members took turns every other year. In 1998, however, it was decided 
that China and Mexico would chair the 2001 and 2002 meetings respectively (APEC 
1998). As global frameworks, the G7 Summit (now G8 Summit) also has a 
Chairmanship in which the chair position rotates every year (Putnam and Bayne 1987). 
The chair position of the G8 summit is partly recognized in official statements that 
mention the name of the member state that will be the host or the chair of the next 
meeting2. It is argued that the chairs of APEC and the G8 summit play the roles of 
inviting new members, setting agendas, and building consensus (Suzuki 2003a). 
  As seen in these multilateral frameworks, official documents do not expressly 
indicate that the presidency and the chair have crucial roles such as setting agendas or 
building consensus. Identifying what kinds of roles the chair has depends on how 
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member states recognize the roles of this position. What is perhaps most important is 
whether or not the Chairmanship is institutionalized in an appropriate institutional 
environment that enables the chair to conduct its roles. The EU has several institutional 
settings including supranational ones such as the EU Commission. In many 
conventional issues, the EU Commission is given the right to propose and initiate EU 
policies. Therefore, it can be argued that the EU Commission takes part in setting the 
agendas for EU meetings. The UN Security Council has its Presidency selected on a 
nation-basis. However, the role of inviting new members, setting agendas, and drafting 
statements is mainly given to the UN Secretary-General (Davidson 1981). Rules and 
procedures in preparation of meetings in these international organizations are also made 
legal by their founding treaties. The presidency in these frameworks has only a limited 
role in preparing meetings. On the other hand, loose frameworks such as ASEAN+3 do 
not have such an organizational capacity. Instead, it can be argued that the 
Chairmanship provides a suitable analytical scheme for a loose multilateral framework. 
It also demonstrates that even loose multilateral frameworks have institutions that affect 
their characteristics. 
 
 
The Chairmanship in ASEAN+3 
 
Apparently, ASEAN+3 has no organizational capacity. However, there has been a 
discussion among ASEAN members regarding this matter in response to Malaysia’s 
proposal to set up a secretariat within the ASEAN+3 framework. In 2001, the press 
statement of the seventh ASEAN summit and the fifth ASEAN+3 summit indicated that 
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‘a proposal was made to establish an ASEAN+3 secretariat’ (ASEAN and ASEAN+3 
2001). At the thirty-fifth ASEAM Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Brunei in July 2002, 
Malaysia was willing to offer seed funding of 10 million US dollars to cover the first 
five years of the secretariat’s operations (New Strait Times, 27 July 2002). Senior 
officials of the other ASEAN members expressed reservations about Malaysia’s 
proposal, insisting that they preferred to strengthen the ASEAN Secretariat in order to 
promote cooperation in ASEAN+33. ASEAN foreign ministers at the thirty-fifth AMM 
only concluded that ‘[w]e resolved to further strengthen the ASEAN+3 cooperation. In 
this context, we noted the need to strengthen the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta and 
Malaysia’s offer to host the ASEAN+3 Secretariat in Kuala Lumpur’ (AMM 2002). 
During the thirty-fifth AMM, senior officials discussed three options: (1) Malaysia’s 
proposal to set up a new secretariat, (2) expansion of the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta 
and (3) establishment of an ASEAN+3 bureau within the ASEAN Secretariat (New 
Strait Times, 27 July 2002). The second option means that the existing mechanism of the 
ASEAN Secretariat would be maintained without changing its organizational structure.  
  Cooperation in the ASEAN+3 framework has been dealt with by the External 
Relations and Coordination Bureau of the ASEAN Secretariat. Responding to 
discussion on the possibility of establishing an ASEAN+3 secretariat, the ASEAN 
Secretariat showed its support for setting up an ASEAN+3 Unit within the External 
Relations and Coordination Bureau of the ASEAN Secretariat. Setting up an ASEAN+3 
Unit is more feasible than establishing an ASEAN+3 Bureau as another new bureau in 
terms of staff and budget constraints of the ASEAN Secretariat.4 In the thirty-seventh 
AMM, ASEAN members announced in its joint statement that ‘[w]e welcomed the 
establishment of the ASEAN+3 Unit within the ASEAN Secretariat, which will assist 
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the ASEAN Chair in coordinating ASEAN+3 cooperation’ (AMM 2004). Clearly, an 
ASEAN+3 secretariat had not been set up as of 2004. This joint statement, however, 
reinforced the argument that the chair be given important roles for the preparation of 
meetings.  
  ASEAN+3 is composed of a summit and other ministerial meetings (Suzuki 2004: 
Annex). As its name indicates, the ASEAN+3 Chairmanship is institutionally supported 
by the ASEAN Chairmanship. In other words, The ASEAN chair hosts ASEAN+3 
meetings5 . Accordingly, ASEAN+3 has a unique Chairmanship that only allows 
ASEAN members to assume its chair. In the ASEAN Chairmanship, the chair rotates in 
an alphabetical order each year. The Bangkok Declaration (ASEAN 1967) describes the 
‘[a]nnual Meeting of Foreign Ministers, which shall be by rotation and referred to as 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. A Standing committee, under the chairmanship of the 
Foreign Minister of the host country or his representative and having as its members the 
accredited Ambassadors of the other member countries, to carry on the work of the 
Association in between Meetings of Foreign Ministers.’ It can be argued that ASEAN+3 
is regarded as one of the frameworks of ASEAN because ASEAN member states 
dominate the seat of the chair at ASEAN+3 meetings. ASEAN members, in particular 
its founding member states, have had experience in the chair since 1967. Japan, China 
and Korea, on the other hand, have no opportunity to assume the chair in any ASEAN+3 
meeting. However, this rule may change in the future as in 2002, ASEAN+3 members 
began discussing how the three non-ASEAN members could be more actively involved 
in ASEAN+3 cooperation. There is a distinct possibility that Japan, China and Korea 
may assume the chair in future ASEAN+3 meetings. 
  The rotation of the ASEAN Chairmanship is based on an alphabetical rule. However, 
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due to the fact that each meeting was regularized in a different year, the same member 
state does not always chair all ASEAN meetings that are held in the same year. For 
example, in 1998, the chair of the ASEAN summit was Vietnam, and the Philippines 
was the chair of the AMM and ASEAN Economic Ministers’ Meeting (AEM). The 
ASEAN+3 summit is a particularly important decision making body that determines the 
direction and nature of the ASEAN+3 framework. This fact relates to the historical 
development of ASEAN+3, a development that started at the summit level. This is in 
contrast to APEC and ASEAN where ministerial meetings were held first, and summits 
followed. In order to analyze how the chair works in determining the direction and 
nature of the ASEAN+3 framework, this article is particularly concerned with the 
ASEAN+3 summit and its chair6.   
 
 
Work of the chair in ASEAN+3 summit 
 
The chairs of the ASEAN+3 summits in 1997, 1999 and 2000 are of particularly interest 
because these summits were turning points in development of the direction and nature 
of the ASEAN+3 framework. 
  In 1997, ASEAN invited Japan, China and Korea to its summit. This was the first 
ASEAN+3 summit, and Malaysia assumed the chair. The idea of inviting the three 
non-ASEAN countries to the ASEAN summit was proposed by Singapore at the 1995 
ASEAN summit (Tanaka 2003: 283; Terada 2003: 262). In 1996, it was reported that 
ASEAN had considered the possibility of inviting the three countries (Asahi Shimbun, 
22 July 1996). It was Mahathir Mohamad, former Prime Minister of Malaysia, who 
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realized this idea. As chair, he initiated an invitation for the three countries to attend the 
1997 ASEAN summit.  
  Membership of ASEAN+3 has developed since Mahathir proposed the East Asia 
Economic Group (EAEG) in December 1990. This group was renamed the East Asia 
Economic Caucus (EAEC) after consultation among ASEAN members in 1991. 
Although the EAEG/EAEC has never been realized (primarily due to Japan’s hesitation 
to support this proposal), ASEAN continued to discuss it in meetings from 1991 to 1997 
(Suzuki 2004: 3-6; Terada 2003: 257-59). In October 1994, Singapore’s Prime Minister, 
Goh Chok Tong, proposed an informal Europe-East Asia summit during his visit to 
France. This led to the founding of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996 (Strait 
Times, 22 October 1994). In preparation for the ASEM summit in Bangkok in March 
1996, ASEAN members along with Japan, China and Korea held several ministerial 
meetings (Suzuki 2004: 3-6)7. During this process, Japan requested that Australia and 
New Zealand be included in ASEM, but Malaysia strongly rejected Japan’s request on 
the grounds that Australia and New Zealand did not share Asian values (Strait Times, 24 
July 1995)8. Malaysia blocked membership of these two countries in ASEM.  
  Throughout its participation in ASEM, Japan showed its interest in meeting with 
other East Asian countries (Suzuki 2004: 3-6). However, Japan’s main priority appeared 
to be on the strengthening of the ASEAN-Japan relationship. In January 1997, then 
Prime Minister of Japan Hashimoto proposed an annual ASEAN-Japan summit (Terada 
2003: 267). In response to Japan’s proposal, Malaysia proposed a counterplan to have a 
summit among ASEAN members, and Japan, China and Korea (Tanaka 2003: 284). 
Mahathir also stated that China should be included when Japan was invited to the 
ASEAN summit, suggesting that it was better to have an amicable policy towards China 
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rather than to contaminate it (Business Times, 15 January 1997). As the same time, 
Malaysia proposed a compromise that the ASEAN-Japan summit be held after the 
ASEAN+3 summit in 1997 (Tanaka 2003?284). The ASEAN-Japan, ASEAN-China, 
and the ASEAN-Korea summit produced three separate joint statements rather than one 
statement at the ASEAN+3 summit level (ASEAN-Japan 1997; ASEAN-China 1997; 
ASEAN-ROK 1997). Malaysia initiated the idea of making an ASEAN+1 channel 
within the ASEAN+3 framework. However, Mahathir regarded the ASEAN+3 summit 
as the most important and suggested regularize it. His proposal was not accepted at the 
first summit in 1997 due to negative responses from Japan and China (Asahi Shimbun, 
17 December 1997), but it did lead to holding the second summit. Without official 
agreement on regularizing summits, a second summit was held, and mutual recognition 
of regularization of summits was promoted among ASEAN+3 members (Tanaka 2003: 
287-88). The 1998 summit chair was Vietnam. However, Vietnam did not initiate any 
proposals or seek to set an agenda for the ASEAN+3 summit. Vietnam had had no 
experience chairing the ASEAN meetings since it joined ASEAN in 1995. It was 
assumed that Vietnam could not conduct the role of the chair since it was still in the 
process of learning how to chair the meetings.  
  The 1999 ASEAN+3 summit witnessed the first joint statement at the ASEAN+3 
level. The leaders of the ASEAN+3 members released a document entitled Joint 
Statement on East Asia Cooperation (ASEAN+3 1999). The Philippines, who assumed 
the summit chair that year, proposed that the leaders should release the first joint 
document as the result of the summit (Mainichi Shimbun (evening), 17 November 1999). 
The Philippines also proposed that an ‘East Asia Security Forum’ be established to turn 
the ASEAN+3 into a framework dealing with security and political matters (Baja 2000; 
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Layador 2000: 441-42; Nabers 2003: 125). This proposal was related to a territorial 
dispute in South China Sea between the Philippines and China. The Philippines 
attempted to bring China into a multilateral forum for discussion of security matters. It 
also attempted to draft a ‘code of conduct’ which would regularize behaviors of the 
relevant members on the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. ASEAN members 
and China could not agree on this draft due to China’s refusal to accept it (Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun, 23 November 1999; Mainichi Shimbun, 25 November 1999; Yomiuri Shimbun, 
25 November 1999). The Philippines insisted on inserting an agreement to establish the 
East Asia Security Forum in the joint statement it proposed to announce at the 1999 
ASEAN+3 summit (Tokyo Yomiuri Shimbun, 10 October 1999). However, other 
members did not support the Philippines’ proposals because they were less enthusiastic 
about establishing a new forum with specific functions. Further, most members were 
satisfied with the ASEAN Regional Forum which was established in 1994 to discuss 
security matters (Asahi Shimbun, 13 November 1999). For these reasons, leaders agreed 
not to establish such a security forum but instead agreed to strengthen cooperation in 
both security and political fields (Tokyo Yomiuri Shimbun, 25, 29 November 1999). The 
joint statement included not only economic and social issues but also political and 
security fields as areas for cooperation. The proposal of the Philippines to set up a 
security forum did not materialize, but it played a driving force in developing the 
character of the ASEAN+3 framework as a forum for dealing with security issues. Such 
was legitimized by the first joint statement.  
  The 2000 summit was outstanding in that two proposals were made. First, Malaysia 
proposed to replace the ASEAN+3 summit with an East Asia summit.9 Second, 
Thailand proposed that a free trade agreement (FTA) among ASEAN+3 members be 
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established (Bangkok Post, 26 November 2000). Goh Chok Tong, the 2000 summit 
chair, referred to these two big ideas by saying that ‘as chairman, I put them together, so 
you can say it came from me’ (Strait Times, 25 November 2000). He proposed to study 
these two ideas in the East Asia Study Group (EASG) that had been proposed by Korea 
(MOFA 2000; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 25 November 2000; Asahi Shimbun, 25, 26 
November 2000). Indonesia showed its dissatisfaction with the Singapore chair’s 
attempt to set agendas and build consensus. Abdurrahman Wahid, then President of 
Indonesia, accused Singapore of mismanagement of the summit and argued that 
Singapore was attempting to strengthen relations among East Asian nations in order to 
satisfy its own national interests (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 27 November 2000; Asahi 
Shimbun, 28 November 2000). Nonetheless, taking advantage of being chair, Singapore 
succeeded in placing two important proposals on the agenda of the 2000 ASEAN+3 
summit. Singapore thus achieved a milestone, and ASEAN+3 began to deal with the 
above proposals. 
  Related to its national interest, Singapore welcomed further discussion on pursuing 
FTAs in East Asia. Since the end of 1999, Singapore has been a leading member in 
ASEAN in terms of signing bilateral FTAs. It signed FTAs with New Zealand, Australia 
and the United States. In East Asia, Singapore signed the Japan-Singapore Economic 
Partnership Agreement (JSEPA) in 2002.10 At the 2002 ASEAN-China summit, ASEAN 
members and China agreed to establish an ASEAN-China FTA within ten years. This 
included the provision for an early harvest in which tariffs on mainly agricultural 
products would be removed (ASEAN-China 2002). During negotiations of the 
ASEAN-China FTA, Thailand and China decided to remove tariffs on 188 agricultural 
products, and this was completed in October 2003 (Asahi Shimbun, 21 August 2003). 
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This agreement was not a bilateral FTA, but a bilateral free trade deal of tariff reduction 
on several products. It was implemented earlier than deals between China and the other 
ASEAN members. Singapore also expressed interest in expediting a bilateral deal with 
China before realization of the ASEAN-China FTA (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 14 
November 2003). In late 2003, Goh Chok Tong urged that China and Japan should 
seriously consider establishing a bilateral FTA between the two countries in order to 
speed up the process of creating an ASEAN+3 FTA (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2 
December 2003). From 1999 to 2000, there was a controversy concerning the 
relationship between the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and bilateral FTAs pursued 
by some ASEAN member states, in particular Singapore and Thailand. Malaysia 
expressed concern about the two members’ attitude towards bilateral FTAs and insisted 
that ASEAN members focus on implementation of the AFTA (Suzuki 2003b: 297-301). 
Malaysia later began to react positively toward establishing FTAs with non-ASEAN 
countries. Although ASEAN members did not reach substantial consensus on this matter, 
they recognized that pursuing FTAs was a necessary strategy. Singapore led discussion 
on FTAs to help the ASEAN members reach consensus on such mutual recognition 
(Low 2003: 121-23). Since 2000, ASEAN+3 members have discussed the possibility of 
developing its FTA as an East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA). This was suggested by 
two reports of the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) and the EASG (EAVG 2001; EASG 
2002). The 2003 ASEAN+3 economic ministers expressed the shared view that ‘the 
establishment of EAFTA shall be a long-term goal which shall be evolutionary and 
step-by-step’ (AEM+3 2003). 
  As for the idea that the ASEAN+3 summit should be replaced by an East Asia summit, 
Goh Chok Tong stated that ASEAN invited Japan, China, and Korea as its guests and 
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therefore hoped that ASEAN members would be invited by the three non-ASEAN 
members in the future (Tokyo Yomiuri Shmbun, 25 November 2000). In this statement, 
he admitted the possibility for Japan, China and Korea to assume the role of chair at 
ASEAN+3 summits. Although the proposal to establish an East Asia summit came from 
Malaysia, the idea had been cultivated since Goh Chok Tong proposed an informal 
Europe-East Asia summit during his visit to France in October 1994. The proposal of an 
East Asia summit was mentioned in the 2000 report of the EAVG that had been 
established in 1999. In this report, it was suggested that the ASEAN+3 summit should 
be replaced by the East Asia Summit (EAS) (EAVG 2001). The 2000 ASEAN+3 
summit witnessed establishment of the EASG, and the EASG submitted its report to the 
2001 ASEAN+3 summit. In the EASG report, Singapore and Japan were leading 
countries promoting the concept of an EAS (EASG 2002: 8). The report suggested that 
it is necessary for develping an EAS to give greater ownership to China, Japan and 
Korea (EASG 2002: 59). As Goh Chok Tong admitted in 2000, this indicated that Japan, 
China and Korea should take charge of the chair of ASEAN+3 or some East Asia 
summit in the future (interview with an official of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan on 
16 March 2004). At the same time, the EASG report further expressed concerns of 
ASEAN members that ASEAN might be marginalized. It pointed out that ‘there is also 
a general feeling that evolution of an EAS should proceed in a gradual and balanced 
way, and a building-block approach is the best way forward’ (EASG 2002; 5, 59)11. In 
the ASEAN+3 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in 2004, it was agreed that an EAS be held 
‘at an appropriate time’ (AMM+3 2004). At this meeting, China showed its interest in 
holding an EAS in 2006. In response to this, Malaysia, the 2005 ASEAN and ASEAN+3 
summit chair, showed its willingness to make the 2005 ASEAN+3 summit the first EAS 
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(Asahi Shimbun, 30 June 2004)12. It remains to be seen whether or not an EAS will be 
realized and if its realization will not marginalize ASEAN. 
  The 2001 ASEAN+3 summit chair, Brunei did not actively initiate any proposal or 
mediate conflicting interests among members. However, the 2001 summit chaired by 
Brunei provided an interesting example demonstrating how other members recognized 
the role of the chair. At this summit, Japan asked Brunei to draft a statement on 
anti-terrorism at the ASEAN+3 summit (Tokyo Yomiuri Shimbun, 4 November 2001). 
The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US gave an incentive to Japan to show 
its position against terrorism in any meeting it might attend. However, Brunei, as the 
chair, did not respond positively to Japan’s request due to negative attitudes of ASEAN 
members and China (Tokyo Yomiuri Shimbun, 4, 8 November 2001). Before the 
ASEAN+3 summit, ASEAN announced ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter 
Terrorism at its own summit (ASEAN 2001). It therefore did not feel the necessity to 
announce one at the ASEAN+3 summit. China also succeeded in chairing the 2001 
APEC summit in Shanghai that announced a similar statement against terrorism (APEC 
2001). China was thus satisfied with its own initiative in APEC and did not support 
Japan’s request, perhaps feeling that it might undervalue the APEC declaration on 
anti-terrorism. Brunei, taking these members into account, decided as the chair not to 
draft a statement on anti-terrorism. As a result, Japan’s request was not accepted and 
there were no statements on terrorism at the ASEAN+3 summit. Nevertheless, Japan’s 
attitude towards the chair implies development of mutual recognition among the 
members that the chair plays a significant role in drafting joint statements.  
  Behavior of the chairs in preparation and management of the summits in 1997, 1999 
and 2000 indicates that the chair has the role of inviting states as new members, setting 
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the agenda, and building consensus. It is necessary, however, to investigate how the 
Chairmanship is institutionalized. As described earlier, the Chairmanship is an informal 
institution and its institutionalization is determined by mutual recognition and 
understanding of the role of the chair by members. The chair of ASEAN+3 meetings is 
also the current chair of ASEAN. The founding members of ASEAN have had 
experiences chairing meetings, but new member states have not. This explains the fact 
that Malaysia, the ‘first’ ASEAN+3 summit chair, could succeed to some extent in 
chairing the summit. Since it joined ASEAN in 1997, Laos, the 2004 ASEAN and 
ASEAN+3 summit chair, has never had experience with chairing a meeting. In 2003, 
Laos sent its senior officials to Malaysia to learn how to prepare and manage the 2004 
summits (New Strait Times, 26 July 2003). 
  This kind of interaction at the senior official level between old and new ASEAN 
members is important for institutionalizing the Chairmanship. All member states share 
the rule of behavior for the chair not only in ASEAN but also in the ASEAN+3 
framework. As discussed, the ASEAN+3 members look forward to future development 
of the ASEAN+3 framework with the active involvement of Japan, China and Korea in 
that the three members will probably chair ASEAN+3 meetings. By so doing, 
ASEAN+3 Chairmanship would give the member states an institutional setting that 
enables them to take part equally and actively in forming the character of the ASEAN+3 
framework.  
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Conclusion 
 
The ASEAN+3 framework is regarded as a loose cooperative framework that focuses on 
regularizing meetings. However, this characteristic provides little motivation to analyze 
the direction and nature of the ASEAN+3 framework with its institutional aspects. 
Chairmanship is an analytical scheme that aids in understanding characteristics of the 
ASEAN+3 framework. Among multilateral frameworks, this institutional analytical 
scheme is particularly important for understanding loose frameworks such as ASEAN+3. 
This is due to the basic character of ASEAN+3 that is based on regularized meetings 
without any organizational entity that is in charge of preparing meetings.  
  As analyzed in this article, the ASEAN+3 summit chair has a role in preparing the 
summit. The performance and work of the chair varies with each member state, because 
each chair has different strategies for how to take advantage of having the position. 
Malaysia attempted to invite Japan, China and Korea to the ASEAN summit under 
Mahathir’s EAEG/EAEC proposal. However, the invitation took a complicated form 
that involved holding both ASEAN+1 (Japan, China and Korea) summits individually 
as well as an ASEAN+3 summit. The Philippines initiated discussion on security issues 
at the 1999 summit through setting the agenda and drafting the first joint statement. Its 
role as the chair was consistent with its national interest involving territorial disputes 
with China. Singapore played an agenda-setting role as the chair when it sought to use 
the ASEAN+3 framework to pursue FTAs and discuss future institutional plans such as 
development of an EAS. Brunei was required to draft a joint statement on anti-terrorism 
although it was not doing this in its role as chair. Despite the fact that each chair 
achieved different results in its preparation and management of the summit, it can be 
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argued that the chair has the specific roles of inviting of new members, setting agendas, 
building consensus among members, and drafting documents. Methods used to analyze 
the institutionalization of the Chairmanship need to be discussed further, but the present 
study of this institution indicates that members share certain rules of behaviors on the 
preparation of meetings. The future development of ASEAN+3 that includes giving 
Japan, China and Korea opportunities to chair the meetings is now under discussion. 
Realization of this strengthens the argument that the Chairmanship is an important 
institutional setting that enables members to be actively and equally involved in forming 
the direction and nature of multilateral frameworks. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 The General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade is a typical example of an international trade regime that is 
not easily distinguished from international laws (see Finlayson and Zacher 1983). Kahler (2001) argues 
that the dispute settlement mechanism of ASEAN has been legalized whereas the one of APEC has not. 
This difference depends on strategic institutional choices taken by members in each framework. 
2 For information on the G8 meetings, refer to (http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/). Last accessed on 19 
September 2004.  
3 For the Thai position, see (New Strait Times, 27, 29 July 2002). The Singaporean and Indonesian 
positions were confirmed by interviews the author conducted with relevant officials in October 2003. 
4 Interviews by the author with officials in the ASEAN Secretariat in October 2003. The existing bureaus 
in the ASEAN Secretariat are for (1) Economic Integration, (2) Finance and Integration Support, (3) 
Resources Development and (4) External Relations and Coordination.  
  (http://www.aseansec.org/13106.htm). Last accessed on 4 March 2004. 
5 Places where meetings are held are usually in the chairing member, but meetings of finance ministers 
are often held during plenary assemblies of the Asia Development Bank, International Monetary Fund 
and World Bank (Suzuki 2004: Annex). In these cases, the hosting country, who offers the place for 
meetings, is not the same as the one who assumes the chair. The chairs, even in these cases, are assumed 
by ASEAN members in turn. Other ASEAN+3 ministerial meetings tend to be held after relevant ASEAN 
ministerial meetings. 
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6 The ASEAN summit chairs from 1997 onwards were Malaysia (1997), Vietnam (1998), the Philippines 
(1999), Singapore (2000), Brunei (2001), Cambodia (2003), Indonesia (2003) and Laos (2004). 
7 Several approaches show that ASEM was a turning point in determining the membership of the 
ASEAN+3 framework (Stubbs 2002: 441–3; Rüland 2000: 432–3; Dieter and Higgott 2002: 32–3; Yeo 
Lay Hwee 2000; Webber 2001: 356–9; Tanaka 2003: 279–82). 
8 Malaysia was not happy with Australia’s efforts in arranging for APEC. Australia rebuked Malaysia for 
its absence in the first APEC summit in Seattle in 1993 (Milne and Mauzy 1999: 140-1). 
9 Mahathir stated that ‘[w]e need to formalize the grouping and call it something’ and further that ‘there 
would be a need to define the meaning of East Asia as many countries might want to claim to be East 
Asian’ (New Strait Times, 25 November 2000). 
10 For further information on the JSEPA, see Ogita (2003). 
11 Malaysia is eager to accelerate realization of an EAS and play an active role in this matter. It held the 
first East Asia Congress on 4-6 August 4–6 2003. On this occasion, Mahathir ‘called on East Asian 
countries to openly say they want to have an East Asian economic grouping and stop hiding behind the 
label of the ASEAN Plus 3’ (New Strait Times, 5 August 2003). 
12 Japan submitted a discussion paper on how to realize an EAS in the ASEAN+3 Foreign Ministers’ 
Meeting in 2004 (Asahi Shimbun, 2 July 2004). 
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